YES, ALITO, THERE IS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY: WHY THE
LEAKED DOBBS OPINION IS DOCTRINALLY UNSOUND
by Nancy C. Marcus *
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 2, 2022, a draft majority opinion dated February 2022 and
authored by Justice Alito in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization 1 was leaked to the public. Protests and outcries
immediately erupted across the country, with those who have long relied
on constitutional protections for safe and legal abortion access horrified
at the draft opinion’s explicit overruling of Roe v. Wade 2 and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 3 While the apparently
imminent reversal of constitutional protections for access to safe and legal
abortion is deeply troubling, even terrifying, for many who may
potentially face unplanned pregnancies, the draft opinion could also have
profoundly troubling repercussions for constitutional doctrine and liberty
protections more broadly. This Essay addresses the doctrinal infirmities
of the underlying analysis of the draft Dobbs opinion, as well as the
*
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1. No. 19-1392 (U.S.) (“Dobbs Draft Op.”).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Dobbs Draft Op. at 5 (“We hold that Roe and Casey must be
overruled.”) and articles documenting public reaction to the opinion, including Lauren Burke, Tears
and Tension as Protesters Swarm Outside US Supreme Court, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2022),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/may/03/roe-v-wade-protests-outside-us-supremecourt/; Nicole Werbeck, See Protests Grow Across the Country as the Supreme Court Deals with Roe
v. Wade Leak, NPR (May 3, 2022), https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2022/05/04/
1096525936/see-protests-grow-across-the-country-as -the-supreme-court-d eals-with-roe-v -wad e/;
Rafqa Touma et al, Protests Swell Across Major Cities as US Reckons with Supreme Court Decision
Draft–As It Happened, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
live/2022/may/03/roe-v-wade-us-supreme-court-preliminary-vot e-overturns-abortion-ruling-leakeddraft-livev-updates/
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resulting dangers posed for the protection of fundamental privacy rights
and liberties in contexts even beyond abortion.
The draft Dobbs opinion bases its rationale for overruling Roe v.
Wade on two deeply flawed premises. First, the opinion claims that
abortion had not been a recognized enumerated right prior to Roe, but had
instead been criminalized in a number of states. 4 Under the apparent
premise that conduct once criminalized cannot subsequently be
constitutionally protected as a fundamental right, Justice Alito, the
opinion’s author, consequently concludes that abortion rights should be
returned to their purported pre-1973 status: nonexistent. 5 Second, the
opinion is grounded in an interpretation of substantive due process that
only recognizes Fourteenth Amendment protections for unenumerated
rights when the specific conduct-framed right for which protection is
sought (i.e., the right to abortion, as opposed to the broader liberty interest
in personal autonomy and privacy, which encompasses that right) must be
“‘deeply rooted’ in this Nation’s history and traditions’ and ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.’” 6
The draft Dobbs opinion then concludes that for those and other
reasons, 7 Roe was an unsound, wrongly decided opinion (although the
draft opinion also acknowledges that Roe followed a longer line of
precedent affirming substantive due process protections for “intimate
sexual relations, contraception, and marriage” 8 ). A reported majority of
Justices would consequently hold under the draft opinion that neither Roe
nor the subsequent Casey decision should be honored under the Court’s
4. Dobbs Draft Op. at 5, 9-10, 15-30.
5. Id. at 65.
6. Id. at 5 (partially, but not fully, quoting and citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks indicated as omitted in Dobbs draft opinion); see also id. at 1314, 24-25.
7. Including the draft opinion’s refusal to honor Casey’s finding of reliance on the Roe
precedent, a critical factor in deciding to abandon stare decisis; the Dobbs draft opinion rejects as
legally inadequate and uncompelling Casey’s reliance conclusion that:
the fact that for two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives. The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance
on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for
people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856. See Dobbs Draft Op. at 60-61 (rejecting Casey’s reliance holding, and
rejecting Casey itself as binding precedent on that point).
8. Dobbs Draft Op. at 5, 31-32.
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longstanding practice of stare decisis. Instead, both should be overruled9
(assurances during their confirmation hearings that they would honor stare
decisis notwithstanding). 10
The remainder of this Essay details how the primary premises
underlying the draft opinion’s overruling of Roe and Casey are infirm as
a matter of constitutional doctrine, precedent, and fact.
II. THE DRAFT OPINION IMPROPERLY CONFLATES FORMERLY
CRIMINALIZED WITH CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED CONDUCT,
ALLOWING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAWS TO E VADE SCRUTINY
The draft opinion’s first premise, that formerly criminalized conduct
cannot be accorded fundamental rights protections, both is flawed and
could result in sweeping repercussions beyond abortion.
The Supreme Court has previously rejected such an approach to
constitutional jurisprudence, emphasizing, “the fact a State’s governing
majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”11
Disregarding that traditional approach to judicial review of
unconstitutional laws, however, the Dobbs opinion would make conduct
once deemed immoral and criminalized as virtually exempt from
subsequent constitutional protection. It could become nearly impossible
to successfully challenge unconstitutional criminal laws in court. Instead,
those laws previously struck down as unconstitutional for criminalizing
protected conduct could be reinstated and deemed constitutional after all.
Even those Supreme Court decisions striking down unconstitutional
miscegenation laws, 12 bans on contraception, 13 and bans on private sexual
conduct between consenting adults 14 could be overturned, with those bans
reinstated.
Furthermore, as some legal scholars have already noted, and as a
dissent to the draft opinion may highlight, describing abortion as
historically prohibited across the country prior to Roe is an overstatement,
and not a sound basis for overruling Roe and Casey. Professor Aaron
9. Id. at 5-6, 35-62.
10. See Oriana Gonzalez, Collins Says Kavanaugh and Gorsuch Possibly Broke Promise on
Roe v. Wade, AXIOS (May 3, 2022), https://www.axios.com/2022/05/03/susan-collins-kavanaughgorsuch-abortion-court-leak./
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 405 U.S. 438, 577 (2003).
12. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
14. See, e.g., Lawrence, 405 U.S. 438.
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Tang has documented that, contrary to the draft opinion’s assertion that at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, two-thirds of states
prohibited “pre-quickening” (pre-fifteen week) abortions, in fact the
majority of states did not ban pre-quickening abortions. 15
III. THE DRAFT OPINION IS BASED ON A FLAWED DUE PROCESS
APPROACH THAT IGNORES CENTURIES OF DEEPLY ROOTED
PROTECTIONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Addressing the second main premise underlying the draft Dobbs
opinion, that there is no constitutional right to privacy in part because
privacy rights are not explicitly enumerated as such, constitutions by their
nature are intended to be broad frameworks, not comprehensive checklists
that detail every specific act protected against government intrusion.16 As
Justice John Marshall wrote, the nature of the Constitution:
requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves . . . . [W]e
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding. . . . [A]
constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs. 17

The tradition of honoring unenumerated rights is a longstanding one
that can be traced back to the Magna Carta of 1214, the Mayflower
Compact of 1620, and early American declarations of inherent,
inalienable rights. 18 Indeed, in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
15. See, e.g., Aaron Tang, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court Flunks Abortion History, LA TIMES
(May 5, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-05-05/abortion-draft-opinion-14thamendment-american-history-quickening. See also Aaron Tang, The Originalist Case for an
Abortion Middle Ground, at 22-54, 60-63, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3921358.
16. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Judicial Mindsets: The Social Psychology of Implicit Theories
and the Law, 90 NEB. L. R EV. 611, 640 & n. 222 (2012) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, THE B ILL OF
R IGHTS: C REATION AND R ECONSTRUCTION (1998); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the
Living Constitution, 103 NW . U. L. R EV. 549 (2009); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 C ONST. C OMMENT. 427, 460-61 (2007); Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Samuel Kercheval, July, 12, 1816, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/letter-to-samuelkercheval/).
17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
18. See Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out of
the Closet, 15 C OLUMBIA J. GENDER & LAW 355, 361 (2006) (citing MILTON R. KONVITZ,
F UNDAMENTAL R IGHTS: HISTORY OF A C ONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 8 (2001); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the guarantees of due process as “having
their roots in Magna Carta’s ‘per legem terrae’”); The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776); VIRGINIA B ILL OF R IGHTS, reprinted in AM. JUR. 2d Desk Book, Item No. 185 (2d ed. 1979).
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wrote that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary because it was so well
understood, even before the Constitution’s ratification, that unenumerated
rights were to be reserved to the people. 19 However, answering
Hamilton’s concerns that the enumeration of some rights in the Bill of
Rights might be construed to deny the existence of those not
enumerated, 20 the Ninth Amendment itself explicitly recognizes the
existence of those unenumerated rights. It provides: “The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” 21 As Justice Breyer has
explained, the Ninth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights “to
make clear that ‘rights, like law itself, should never be fixed, frozen, that
new dangers and needs will emerge, and that to respond to these dangers
and needs, rights must be newly specified to protect the individual’s
integrity and inherent dignity.’” 22
The draft Dobbs opinion denying protections for rights not
enumerated cannot be fairly reconciled with the text of the Ninth
Amendment, or with the broader historical tradition of taking seriously
inherent, inalienable rights and liberty interests implicit but unenumerated
in the Constitution, including under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. As Justice Harlan has explained, underscoring the
breadth of unenumerated rights entitled to constitutional protection, the
full scope of liberty protections “cannot be found in or limited by the
precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution.” 23
Regarding privacy rights more specifically, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis in 1890 co-authored a Harvard Law Review “Right to
Privacy” article that traced the evolution of privacy rights from early
property protections to intellectual, emotional, and spiritual autonomy. 24
As a Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis subsequently explained that the
Constitution’s drafters “conferred, as against the government, the right to

See also id. at 360-78 (tracing the historic roots and evolution of the constitutional right to privacy
more generally).
19. THE F EDERALIST No. 84, at 512-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
20. See Marcus, supra note 18, at 362.
21. U.S. C ONST. amend. IX.
22. Stephen Breyer, Our Constitutional Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 245, 269-70 (2002)
(quoting Bernard Bailyn, Remarks at the First Millennium Evening at the White House (Feb. 11,
1998)).
23. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandies, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R EV. 193 (1890).
See also Marcus, supra note 18, at 371-72.
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be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights.” 25 Later, the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut described the right to privacy as “older than the
Bill of Rights,” citing cases going back to 1886 that, as the Court
described, “bear witness that the right of privacy . . . is a legitimate one.”26
However, with Griswold describing contraceptive rights in terms of
Ninth Amendment unenumerated rights, the Bill of Rights’ penumbras,
and Fourteenth Amendment due process, 27 if Alito’s draft Dobbs opinion
rejecting parallel language in Roe 28 stands, the right to birth control would
be hanging by a thread. The Court in Lawrence over a quarter of a century
ago embraced the binding precedent of contraceptive rights cases and their
recognition of a reproductive right to privacy quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird
to emphasize that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 29 Today’s Court has
signaled no similar intention of honoring that principle in its interpretation
of a right to reproductive autonomy.
While the potential repercussions of the Dobbs draft opinion
mocking Roe’s description of the constitutional roots of the right to
privacy—the same roots identified in Griswold—are disturbing, the draft
opinion’s treatment of substantive due process in particular is also
particularly troubling on a doctrinal level.
Those Justices joining Alito’s draft Dobbs opinion would limit
substantive due process protections to only those specific rights that can
be identified as deeply rooted in history and tradition when reduced to
their most narrow articulation (i.e., the “right to abortion,” as opposed to
a more broadly framed right to individual autonomy and privacy in one’s
most intimate life choices). 30 However, requiring that abortion access

25. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Public Utilities Comm’n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139 (1962); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
27. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-85.
28. See Dobbs Draft Op. at 9 (discussing Roe, 410 U.S. at 152).
29. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (as quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565).
30. Let alone Casey’s description of “[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,” as
“central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
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itself be traditionally designated as a right “deeply rooted” in history and
tradition, as opposed to it being protected as falling within the ambit of
broader constitutionally protected privacy and personal autonomy rights,
is a misapplication of substantive due process jurisprudence.
Such a narrow approach to substantive due process conflicts with
precedent respecting the protection of reproductive and related privacy
rights as falling under broader, deeply rooted liberty protections and
principles, precedent acknowledged even by the draft Dobbs opinion. 31
The draft opinion’s overly narrow “right to abortion” framing of the
liberty interest at issue in reproductive autonomy cases repeats the mistake
of the sodomy-ban-affirming Court in Bowers v. Hardwick. As the
Lawrence v. Texas Court explained in overruling Bowers, the Bowers
Court had improperly framed the right at stake in that case in absurdly
narrow “right to sodomy” terms rather than in terms of the broader liberty
interests at issue, thereby “fail[ing] to appreciate the extent of the liberty
at stake.” 32 In rejecting the Bowers articulation of the right at issue as a
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,” the Bowers dissent
and Lawrence majority opinion explained that such narrow phrasing of
liberty interests amounts to improperly “derid[ing] Hardwick’s position
as ‘at best, facetious,’” thereby dishonoring the broader liberty interest at
stake. 33 The Lawrence Court further explained, “[t]o say that the issue in
Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans
the claim the individual put forward.” 34
The approach of framing fundamental rights in terms of the broader
liberty interests rather than minimizing them through narrow act-specific
formulations is itself well-rooted in constitutional jurisprudence history.
Long before Glucksberg and other modern substantive due process cases,
Corfield v. Coryell, an 1825 opinion addressing unenumerated
fundamental rights protections, addressed the question of whether the
Constitution requires a state to permit other states’ citizens to fish for
shellfish in its waters. 35 There, the Court recognized that the right at issue
was not a “right to fish for shellfish,” but rather the fundamental
life.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (language quoted only partially, and criticized, in the draft Dobbs
opinion, at 30).
31. See Dobbs Draft Op. at 31 (describing Casey’s reliance on precedent including, for
example, contraceptive rights cases such as Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Carey
v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (forced
sterilization)).
32. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
33. Id. at 596 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.186, 194 (1986)).
34. Id.
35. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
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citizenship rights involving trade and travel guaranteed by the
Constitution. 36
As Justice Harlan similarly wrote in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, the
full scope of due process liberty protections is not confined to those
specific rights enumerated in the Constitution, not being “a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom
of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.” Rather, “[i]t is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.” 37
Although the draft Dobbs opinion cites Glucksberg in support of its
substantive due process approach, its description of Glucksberg is
deceptively incomplete. The draft opinion describes Glucksberg’s
holding regarding the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as
follows: “That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are
not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.’” 38 That passage of the draft Dobbs opinion, however,
omits not only internal quotation marks but also pertinent language from
the cases cited therein, conveniently discarding the precedential context
for this passage of Glucksberg. Specifically, the cases quoted by
Glucksberg as the contextual foundation for its “deeply rooted . . . implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty” analysis, the citations of which are
omitted by the Dobbs draft opinion, are Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
Snyder v. Massachusetts, and Palko v. Connecticut. 39 Palko and Snyder,
in turn, provide that what triggers fundamental rights protection is the
implication of “a principle of justice so rooted in the tradition and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 40 Similarly,
Palko describes substantive due process in broad terms, as protecting
“liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action.” 41 As such, reading of
Glucksberg in conjunction with the Palko and Snyder passages it relies
upon reveals that substantive due process analysis should be not actspecific, but rather, should focus on the underlying justice-based
36. Id.
37. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Dobbs Draft Op. at 5 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
39. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977), Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), Snyder v. Massachusetts, 219 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)).
40. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder, 219 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added)).
41. Id. at 327.
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principles implicated when liberties are restricted in various contexts.
Furthermore, Moore, the very first case cited by Glucksberg in this
passage in support of its explanation of substantive due process, affirms
Fourteenth Amendment protections for “freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life.” 42
Similarly, in a passage also conveniently omitted by the Dobbs draft
opinion, the Glucksberg opinion explicitly recognizes abortion among the
many other specific rights that are encompassed within the broader liberty
protections of the Due Process Clause, explaining that over time, the
Supreme Court has held that along with “the specific freedoms protected
by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process
Clause includes the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the
education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use
contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” 43
Even more pertinent is Glucksberg’s reliance on Casey, one of two
cases the Dobbs opinion would cite Glucksberg to overrule. It defies logic
and the bounds of irony to assert the Glucksberg precedent as justification
for overruling Casey along with Roe, when the Glucksberg opinion
explicitly follows and positively cites Casey. 44 As previously explained
on this point:
The Court’s Glucksberg opinion does not preclude continued
recognition of constitutional history as a fluid concept or continued
acknowledgement that traditions change over time. By opening its
discussion of the role of history in due process cases with citations to
Moore, Cruzan, and Casey, cases decided in the context of changing
traditions, the Glucksberg majority affirmed the principle of a living
constitution which reflects evolving traditions. 45

Similarly, while not binding precedent, Justice Stevens’ concurrence
in Glucksberg (also not addressed by the draft Dobbs opinion) further
explains that in due process cases, the Court has described the liberty
interests at stake in intimate life decisions “as implicating ‘basic values,’
as being ‘fundamental,’ and as being dignified by history and
42. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923), Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925)).
43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); Skinner, 316
U.S. 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S.
438; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
44. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
45. Marcus, supra note 18, at 392-93 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710 (internal citations
omitted)).
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traditions.” 46 Stevens explained that such cases consistently reflect “the
origins of the American heritage of freedom—the abiding interest in
individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right
to decide how he will live his life intolerable.” 47
In Lawrence v. Texas, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court
provided critical clarification of the substantive due process doctrine in
the context of sexual autonomy. The Lawrence Court embraced and
adapted Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick recognizing that
issues of sexual autonomy implicate “the individual’s right to make
certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his
family’s, destiny. The Court has referred to such decisions as implicating
‘basic values,’ as being ‘fundamental,’ and as being dignified by history
and tradition.” 48 Addressing the same principles previously addressed in
Glucksberg, the Lawrence decision’s overruling of Bowers indicates that
while tradition is certainly a component of substantive due process
analysis, specific traditions of denying rights are not the types of traditions
that are deserving of special protected. In contrast, while traditions of
discrimination and rights denials receive no deference under the
Fourteenth Amendment, traditionally honored liberty interests, and the
rights they encompass, do. On that point, Lawrence affirms the Court’s
traditional recognition of the historic “origins of the American heritage of
freedom—the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state
intrusions on the citizen’s right to decide how he will live his life
intolerable.” 49
Such powerful affirmations by the Supreme Court of the American
tradition of taking personal liberty seriously stand in stark contrast with
the Dobbs draft opinion, which undermines even the very doctrinal
building blocks and principles affirmed in Glucksberg. The draft opinion
fails to engage a meaningful analysis of Glucksberg, the precedents upon
which it relied, and its progeny, including the subsequent clarifying
language of the Supreme Court that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.” 50
46. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744-45 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter
Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted)).
47. Id.
48. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214-20 (quoting in part Fitzgerald, 523 F.2d at 719-20); see also
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling
in Bowers and it should control here.”).
49. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744-45 (Stevens, J., concurring).
50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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In addition to the draft opinion’s flawed doctrinal interpretation of
Glucksberg, its application of Glucksberg is also factually inaccurate. For
example, in one passage, the draft opinion substitutes the assisted suicide
language from Glucksberg with abortion language: “The Court in Roe
could have said of abortion exactly what Glucksberg said of assisted
suicide: ‘Attitudes toward [abortion] have changed . . . but our laws have
consistently condemned, and continued to prohibit, [that practice].’”51
Here, the draft opinion both is factually misleading and substantively
defeats its own argument. Even if the draft opinion were accurate in
describing most states as banning even early abortion at the time of the
1973 Roe decision, 52 it is inaccurate to describe American laws as
consistently prohibiting abortion even after Roe. To the contrary, from
Roe until the present, while some regulations of abortion have been
upheld, no pre-viability abortion bans have been upheld as constitutional
in the forty-nine years since Roe.
For half a century, people across America of child-bearing age have
come to rely on Roe as protecting their right to be free from state bans on
abortion. To betray that reliance based on a misapplication of
longstanding substantive due process doctrine would be an egregious
misstep by the Supreme Court, anathema to longstanding and fundamental
principles of constitutional liberty.
IV. THE DRAFT OPINION THREATENS OTHER REPRODUCTIVE
PERSONAL AUTONOMY RIGHTS AND PRECEDENTS

AND

Even while rejecting broad liberty protections for those seeking safe
and legal abortions, the draft Dobbs opinion does acknowledge a line of
precedent affirming similar substantive due process liberty protections in
other cases, as previously discussed. 53 However, the opinion purports to
distinguish those cases, including those involving the right to
contraception such as Griswold and Eisenstadt, from abortion cases by
contending that only abortion cases involve potential human life, or, an
“unborn human being.” 54 Considering that contraception also prevents
potential life from being actualized, that distinction is disingenuous. The
draft Dobbs opinion lacks any meaningful assurances that the precedents
51. Dobbs Draft Op. at 25 (brackets in original) (quoting in part Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719).
52. As previously described, however, the draft opinion’s description of the breadth of abortion
bans leading up to Roe is an exaggeration, at best. See supra note 15 and accompanying text, citing
Tang, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court Flunks Abortion History; Tang, The Originalist Case for an
Abortion Middle Ground.
53. See supra notes 8 and 31 and accompanying text.
54. See Dobbs Draft Op. at 7 (quoting MISS. C ODE ANN. § 41-41-191).
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of Griswold and Eisenstadt will not be next on the chopping block. This
is particularly the case when the very jurisprudential foundation for the
right to privacy affirmed in Roe that was rejected as unsound in the draft
Dobbs opinion mirrors and follows Griswold’s analysis identifying the
right to privacy in a reproductive rights context as grounded in various
constitutional protections of inherent and inalienable rights, including the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. To overrule Roe as based on a flawed
identification of that same right to privacy would certainly pave the path
for similarly overruling Griswold in a future case, sweeping away longrelied-upon reproductive rights to contraception free from government
interference.
Reproductive freedoms are not the only rights threatened by the draft
Dobbs opinion. The draft opinion could also be used to strip away other
rights targeted by those hostile to what they deem untraditional
expressions of personal liberty, including queer families and other
intimate associations. The draft opinion’s version of liberty, which denies
protections for rights denied by past generations, is constrained by
prejudices of the past. Under that approach, same-sex marriage, interracial
marriage, and contraception could lose their constitutional protections,
since at one time, if only in the distant past, they had been criminally
prohibited and not explicitly enumerated as fundamental rights.
On that point, some may find comfort in the opinion’s draft language
“emphasiz[ing] that our decision concerns the constitutional right to
abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be understood
to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” 55 Others may
find that language to be empty platitudes. They may be less trusting,
refusing to fall for assurances that a final Dobbs opinion resembling the
leaked draft would leave intact other rights that have been recognized
under the umbrella of Fourteenth Amendment liberty protections. After
all, it is not uncommon for court opinions to hold themselves out as
narrow in scope, only to have their precedential force extended to other
contexts in subsequent cases. 56
Finally, it is not entirely unlikely that if something substantially
similar to the leaked Dobbs opinion draft, including its interpretation and
55. Id. at 62.
56. Justice Scalia warned of such narrowly articulated holdings being applied more broadly in
his strident dissents in United States v. Windsor and Lawrence v. Texas, both of which he accurately
predicted would serve as foundations for an eventual decision affirming a broad right to same-sex
marriage. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 798 (2013). In that respect, the draft Dobbs
opinion consequently may represent, in a sense, backlash to or even revenge for Lawrence’s decision
overruling Bowers and leading to marriage equality.

2022]

THERE IS A R IGHT TO P RIVACY

113

application of Glucksberg, becomes the final opinion of the Court, even
same-sex marriage and LGBTQ rights could be endangered. After all,
there is already a pattern of same-sex marriage and LGBTQ-rights
opponents invoking Glucksberg to deny same-sex couples and LGBTQ+
individuals substantive due process rights through arguments that parallel
that in the draft Dobbs opinion. 57 The precedent set by such an opinion
would not just pave the path for a slippery slope; it could lead to a tsunami
of further rights deprivations of a historically unprecedented58 magnitude.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the draft Dobbs opinion fails to honor Justice
Frankfurter’s admonition in 1949 that “[g]reat concepts like . . . ‘liberty’
were purposely left to gather meaning from experience,” because those
“who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society
remains unchanged.” 59 Likewise, it fails to heed the warning of Thomas
Jefferson that “[w]e might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors.” 60
It would not be sufficient to merely describe the draft Dobbs opinion
as reflecting the mentality of those stuck in the past. Rather, the draft
opinion reveals the intent of a majority of the Supreme Court to ignore
over fifty years’ of precedent recognizing fundamental reproductive
rights, while forcing the nation to revert to an era of personal liberty
infringements, and unsafe and illegal abortions. The justification for doing
so, the lack of explicit abortion rights protections in past centuries, fails
to respect the longstanding principle that constitutional rights “must draw
[their] meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” 61 Allowing anything even similar in
57. See Marcus, supra note 18, at 382-87 (discussing the Scalia dissent in Lawrence that
describes the Lawrence majority opinion as in conflict with Glucksberg and also describes Roe and
Casey as “eroded” by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588, 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting); and also discussing
other federal court opinions invoking Glucksberg to limit the rights of same-sex couples in the
aftermath of Lawrence, e.g., Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 81617 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding state ban on adoption by individuals engaging in “homosexual
conduct”), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04-478, 73
U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2005), and Williams v. Attorney General, 378 F.3d 1232, 1236-38,
1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding state ban on the sale of sex toys)).
58. And ironically so, being done in the name of respecting history and tradition.
59. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 16.
61. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)). See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304, 321 (2002).
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substance to the leaked draft Dobbs opinion, stripping away deeply-rooted
fundamental rights to privacy and personal autonomy in our most intimate
life choices would be anathema to the Constitution’s promises of liberty
that have long stood as the foundation of an ever-evolving and enlightened
constitutional democracy. To honor American tradition is to respect our
ability to increase protections for individual rights over time, not to
disregard a half century of reliance on privacy-affirming precedent,
denying Americans our fundamental right to be let alone in our most
intimate life choices, free from government coercion over our bodies and
autonomy.

